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When we use a computer, its performance seems to degrade progres-
sively. This is not a mere impression. Over the years of owning a par-
ticular machine, it will get sluggish. Sometimes this slowdown is caused 
by hardware faults, but more often the culprit is software: programs get 
more complicated, as more features are added and as old bugs are patched 
(or not), and greater demands are placed on resources by new programs 
running in the background. After a while, even rebooting the computer 
does not restore performance, and the only solution is to upgrade to a new 
machine.
Philosophy can be a bit like a computer getting creakier. It starts well, 
dealing with significant and serious issues that matter to anyone. Yet, in 
time, it can get bloated and bogged down and slow. Philosophy begins to 
care less about philosophical questions than about philosophers’ questions, 
which then consume increasing amounts of intellectual attention. The 
problem with philosophers’ questions is not that they are impenetrable 
to outsiders — although they often are, like any internal game — but that 
whatever the answers turn out to be, assuming there are any, they do not 
matter, because nobody besides philosophers could care about the ques-
tions in the first place.
This is an old problem. In the sixteenth century, the French scholar 
and doctor François Rabelais satirized scholastic philosophy in his 
Gargantua and Pantagruel. In a catalogue of 139 invented book titles that 
he attributes to the library of the Abbey of St. Victor, he lists such titles as 
“The Niddy-noddy of the Satchel-loaded Seekers, by Friar Blindfastatis” 
and “The Raver and idle Talker in cases of Conscience.”
Centuries later, we seem to be back to the same problem. This is how 
philosophy speaks today: “The Failure of Class: Postcapitalist narrative 
and textual precapitalist theory” and “Deconstructing Lyotard: Cultural 
narrative and premodern dedeconstructivism.” Or: “As Lewis taught us 
in a classic series of articles, trope theories Gettierise zombie arguments” 
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and “While the contextualist disagrees, we still hold that supposed mind/
body ‘problems’ cannot generate an unacceptably Russellian picture of the 
world.”
Do not try to understand these lines. I produced the first two using 
a “Postmodernism Generator,” and the second two using an “Analytic 
Philosophy Generator.” They sound like real examples of contempo-
rary scholasticism — philosophy talking about itself to itself in its own 
jargon. Such scholasticism is the ultimate freezing of the system, the 
equivalent of a Windows computer’s “blue screen of death”: so many 
resources are devoted to internal issues that no external input can be 
processed anymore, and the system stops working. The world may be 
undergoing a revolution, Rome may be burning, but the philosophical 
discourse remains detached, meaningless, and utterly oblivious. Time for 
an upgrade.
A New Focus for Philosophy
How should philosophy be upgraded so that it can address real-life issues 
again? In a talk in April 2010, Bill Gates asked “whether the brightest 
minds are working on the most important problems.” The problems he 
was thinking of were some of those affecting the world’s poorest people, 
such as the lack of adequate health care and nutrition, and dangerous and 
unsanitary environmental conditions, but he was also thinking of the need 
for access to good education and for energy production. Surely, the list 
would have to include also the need for peace in war-torn countries, for 
human rights, and much else besides.
But if these are today’s most pressing issues, what should the bright-
est philosophical minds be doing? Maybe they should stop philosophizing 
and start doing something about this messy world instead. We could shut 
down our philosophy departments and put an end to philosophers’ corrup-
tion of the youth. But this solution smacks of self-defeat. It would be like 
burning the wicker basket we are traveling in because our hot-air balloon 
is descending too quickly. Philosophy is the sort of thing you need to keep 
in a good world, not what you should get rid of in a bad one. Athens is a 
better place with Socrates. The fact is that philosophy can be extremely 
helpful, for it can forge and refine the intellectual tools we need for deal-
ing with the most challenging problems that confront us. The brightest 
philosophical minds can contribute insights and visions, analyses and 
syntheses, theories and critiques, questions and answers that can help us 
to solve these problems. If this still sounds rather useless compared to 
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actually doing something, consider that philosophy takes care of the roots, 
so that the rest of the plant might grow more healthily.
But even if we accept this role for philosophy, which ideas, theories, 
and perspectives should philosophers be designing now and for the 
 foreseeable future, so that their contributions will be timely and helpful? 
Which philosophical questions should they be addressing?
The answers will have to do with this particular time in human his-
tory. Philosophical “upgrading” moments are rare, and they are usually 
prompted by important transformations in the surrounding reality. Since 
the Nineties, I have been arguing that we have reached one of those 
moments — a turning point in our history. The epochal transition from 
an analogue to a digital world and the rapid development of information 
technologies are changing every aspect of our lives: education, work, and 
entertainment; communication, business, and commerce; love, hate, and 
anything in between; politics, conflicts, and peace; culture, health, and even 
how we remember the dead. All this and more is being relentlessly trans-
formed by technologies that have the recording, transmission, and process-
ing of information as their core functions.
As information technologies come to affect all areas of life, they are 
becoming implicated in our most important problems — their causes, effects, 
and solutions, the scientific investigations aimed at explaining them, the 
concepts created to understand them, the means of discussing them, and 
even, as in the case of Bill Gates, the wealth required to tackle them.
Furthermore, information technologies don’t just modify how we act 
in the world; they also profoundly affect how we understand the world, 
how we relate to it, how we see ourselves, how we interact with each 
other, and how our hopes for a better future are shaped. All these are old 
philosophical issues, of course, but we must now consider them anew, with 
the concept of information as a central concern.
This means that if philosophers are to help enable humanity to make 
sense of our world and to improve it responsibly, information needs to be a 
significant field of philosophical study. Among our mundane and technical 
concepts, information is currently not only one of the most important and 
widely used, but also one of the least understood. We need a philosophy 
of information.
How to Ask a Question
In the fall of 1999, NASA lost radio contact with its Mars Climate Orbiter, 
a $125 million weather satellite that had been launched the year before. In 
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a maneuver to enter the spacecraft into orbit around Mars, the trajectory 
had put the spacecraft far closer to Mars than planned, so that it directly 
entered the planet’s atmosphere, where it probably disintegrated. The 
reason for this unhappy event was that for a particular software file, the 
Lockheed Martin engineering team had used English (imperial) units of 
measurement instead of the metric units specified by the agency, whose 
trajectory modelers assumed the data they were looking at was provided 
in metric.
This incident illustrates a simple lesson: successful cooperation 
depends on an agreement between all parties that the information being 
exchanged is fixed at a specified level. Wrongly assuming that everyone 
will follow the rules that specify the level — for example, that impulse 
will be expressed not as pound-seconds (the English unit) but as newton-
seconds (the metric unit) — can lead to costly mistakes. Even though this 
principle may seem obvious, it is one of the most valuable contributions 
that philosophy can offer to our understanding of information. This is 
because, as we will see, failing to specify a level at which we ask a given 
philosophical question can be the reason for deep confusions and useless 
answers. Another simple example will help to illustrate the problem.
Suppose you want to buy a secondhand car. You can treat the informa-
tion about its price as an answer to a yes-or-no question: “Is the price of 
this car 5,000?” “Yes.” You see immediately that there is a problem, not 
with the answer, but with the question: it contains no indication of the 
type of currency. The correct way of putting the question to which “Yes” 
is a meaningful answer is: “Is the price of this car $5,000?” We have just 
introduced what computer scientists call the correct level of abstraction : the 
variable represented by the symbol for U.S. dollar, not, for example, by 
the symbol for euro, is the level at which you are considering the 5,000. 
Using a metric or an English system of measurement is another choice of 
level of abstraction. (The reason computer scientists speak of levels and of 
abstraction is that an information-based system, such as a computer, can 
be understood as a hierarchy in which higher levels build on lower levels, 
and the mode of interaction with the system, for example the computer 
language that a programmer uses, depends on the level.)
To understand what philosophy of information needs to learn from 
this method of computer science, we can look at an example from Alan 
Turing, the great pioneer of computer science. He showed how philo-
sophical and conceptual questions too could be answered only by fixing 
the level at which it would make sense to receive an answer. This is one of 
the most lasting lessons of his famous imitation game, also known as the 
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Turing Test of artificial intelligence, which he described in a 1950 paper. 
Here is a simplified version. Turing was interested in understanding the 
difference between human and mechanical computation. But he rightly 
refused even to try to provide an answer to the question as it is often 
asked, “Can machines think?,” because he considered it a problem “too 
meaningless to deserve discussion.” If you recall, in our simple example 
this would be like asking the price of the secondhand car in absolute fig-
ures, insisting that no currency is used to express it. Nonsense. Likewise, 
Turing objected that the question “Can machines think?” involved vague 
concepts such as “machine” and “think.” Although we could try to find out 
what these terms mean in common discourse through a large survey, this 
would be an absurd way of trying to answer the question. In other words, 
the question lacked a clear level of abstraction.
So Turing suggested replacing the question with the imitation game, 
which fixes certain variables in a rules-based scenario that is easily imple-
mentable and controllable. Suppose that A and B are a human being and 
a computer, but you do not know which is which. You can ask A and B 
any question simultaneously, but they are in another place and you can 
only interact with them by e-mail (or, in Turing’s day, by teleprinter). 
If after a reasonable amount of time you cannot tell which is the human 
and which the computer, then the computer has passed the test — that is, 
the computer is at least as good as the human in providing answers to 
the questions you asked. Turing’s test is based on a weaker version of 
Leibniz’s law of the identity of indiscernibles: if, everything else being 
equal, significant differences between A’s and B’s answers are indiscern-
ible, then A and B are interchangeable. Given the same input of questions, 
the output of answers a human and a computer can generate are such 
that the differences between the two are insufficient for the purposes of 
unmistakable recognition.
Turing thought that computers would pass his test by the year 2000. 
He was wrong. But while most discussions of the test focus on his mis-
taken prediction, or on what consequences one should draw if computers 
were able to pass the test, the method of the test was in fact far more 
important than the prediction. By suggesting the imitation game, Turing 
specified a level of abstraction for asking a complex question about the 
capability of computers: the “currency” he chose for the game was human 
intelligence, but it could have been something else, from animal intel-
ligence to human creativity, as many other versions of the game have 
shown. By specifying the level — human intelligence as measured by 
the imitation game — Turing was able to replace his original and vague 
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 question with a new and answerable one, which may be summed up thus: 
“May one conclude that a machine is thinking, at the level of abstraction 
represented by the imitation game?”
After more than half a century, we are still learning this crucial les-
son of fixing questions at certain levels. Take, for example, pancomputa-
tionalism — the idea that every physical system, and the entire universe, 
is a computational system. A 2012 New Scientist article claimed that “the 
universe is a computer, and everything that goes on in it can be explained 
in terms of information processing.” The physicist and computer scien-
tist Stephen Wolfram has argued for a “new kind of science” that would 
study the computational nature of “a vast range of systems, from simple 
programs to brains to our whole universe.” And the computer scientist 
Gregory Chaitin writes that the universe “is constantly computing its 
future state from its current state” and that “actual computers like your 
PC just hitch a ride on this universal computation!”
This is an intriguing metaphor, but it should not be taken seriously. 
Apart from a large number of scientific difficulties, including the endorse-
ment of a controversial form of determinism, the view fails to apply 
Turing’s method of levels of abstraction. To understand why, consider 
that informational concepts are so extensive that, given the right level, 
anything can be presented as a computational system, from a building to a 
volcano, from a forest to a dinner, from a brain to a company. Likewise, any 
process can be represented computationally: digesting, flying, and knitting 
all become forms of input-process-output according to some program.
So the point is to ask not whether there is a level of abstraction at 
which the whole universe can be viewed as computational — because it is 
trivially true that there is — but rather whether that is the right level at 
which to analyze the universe without blurring all differences, like a night 
in which all cows are black, to borrow a saying from Hegel. Also, since it 
is possible to think in some vague sense of all systems as computational, 
pancomputationalism lacks an important feature of any good theory: a 
counterexample must be possible in principle. But pancomputationalism 
is simply not vulnerable to a refutation. By failing to look at computation 
at a specified level, all things become computational in some way. It’s like 
asking if machines can think, or if the car costs 5,000.
What philosophy can offer to contemporary debates that involve the 
concept of information, whether we discuss the intelligence of computers 
or the makeup of the universe, is clarity about how to ask the right ques-
tions so that answers are possible and useful. Failing to ask the right 
questions can only lead to confusions and misunderstandings.
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Know Thyself Anew
At the risk of oversimplifying, science has two fundamental ways of 
changing our understanding. One may be called extrovert, or about the 
world, and the other introvert, or about ourselves. Three scientific revolu-
tions in the modern era have had deep impacts of both kinds. In changing 
our understanding of the world around us and how we can interact with 
it, they also modified our conception of who we are and may expect to 
become — a story that is the subject of Friedel Weinert’s book Copernicus, 
Darwin, and Freud: Revolutions in the History and Philosophy of Science.
First, after Copernicus, the heliocentric cosmology displaced the 
Earth and hence humanity from the center of the universe. Second, 
Darwin showed that all species of life have evolved over time from com-
mon ancestors through natural selection, thus displacing humanity from 
the pinnacle of rational design. And third, following Freud, we acknowl-
edge that the mind is more than pure rationality, that it is influenced by 
hidden processes and subject to forces of which we are unconscious. If we 
are reluctant to consider psychoanalysis a strictly scientific enterprise like 
astronomy or evolutionary theory, we might yet be willing to concede that 
contemporary neuroscience plays a revolutionary role in overturning the 
idea that we are transparent to ourselves.
There may be reasons to question this picture of three revolutions. 
After all, Freud, who himself presented this exact historical timeline 
in “A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis,” interpreted the three 
moments as part of an ongoing process of reassessment of human nature. 
Each of the three, he wrote, is a blow against “the universal narcissism 
of men, their self-love.” This way of looking at it was obviously self-
serving, as it helped to support his suggestion that his own blow in the 
realm of psychology was the most severe of the three, and therefore met 
so much resistance. But while attributing such significance to his work 
may have been narcissistic in its own way, in retrospect it does not seem 
so unreasonable. Similarly, when we now perceive that something very 
significant and profound has happened to human life and self-perception 
after the computer revolution, our intuition may again be right, because 
we are experiencing what may be described as a fourth revolution in the 
process of dislocation and reassessment of humanity’s nature and role in 
the universe.
Computer science and its technological applications have exer-
cised both an extrovert and an introvert influence. They have provided 
unprecedented powers over natural and artificial realities; and by doing 
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so, they have cast new light on who we are and how we are related to 
the world. Today, we are slowly accepting the idea that we are not at 
the center of the growing “infosphere” that surrounds us because we are 
not the only smart agents able to carry out complex tasks. Our comput-
ers are often better than we are at dealing with information. So when 
we define artificial intelligence as the successful performance by digital 
technologies of tasks that, if left to humans, would require intelligence, 
we are really telling a new story about ourselves. Add to this the fact that 
we see ourselves increasingly as informationally embodied organisms 
(what I have called “inforgs”) — think for example of the idea of DNA as 
software — mutually connected and embedded in an informational envi-
ronment that we share with both natural and artificial agents similar to 
us in many respects.
If we had to choose a representative figure of this latest revolution, 
it would undoubtedly be Turing. He did more than anyone to lay the 
conceptual foundations for computer science. And by helping us to think 
about computation, cognition, intelligence, and how we might see our-
selves in relation to computers, Turing has changed our philosophical 
anthropology as much as Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud. This has had 
a significant impact on what it means to do philosophy after Turing, as 
philosophers now face the task of how best to understand ourselves in 
this new era.
Admittedly, it would be too much of a stretch to attribute to Turing 
the foundation or even the beginning of a new philosophy of informa-
tion. After all, he did not focus on the concept of information itself, or 
on problems about communication understood as information flow or 
transmission. The index of a large 2004 collection of his writings, The 
Essential Turing, does not even contain an entry for “information,” and 
David Luenberger’s 2006 book Information Science mentions Turing only 
in relation to his work as cryptographer during the Second World War 
and his short career thereafter.
And yet, without Turing, his groundbreaking work on information 
processing, its scientific and technological consequences, and his efforts to 
devise useful concepts for thinking about them, contemporary interest in 
the philosophy of information would be very hard to explain. The fact that 
we are today more likely to treat computers as communication machines 
rather than powerful calculators, and smart phones as mini-computers 
rather than telephones indicates how deep the influence of his work has 
been on our world.
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The Time Is Right
Information is, in a way, the Cinderella in the history of philosophy. 
Any philosophy of knowledge, no matter whether ordinary (epistemol-
ogy) or scientific (philosophy of science) requires an understanding 
of information — for instance in discussions of sensory perception and 
knowledge acquisition. There is no ethics without choices, responsibili-
ties, and moral evaluations, all of which need a lot of relevant and reliable 
information and quite a good management of it. Logic was first a matter 
of the study of arguments, and then of mathematical proofs, but today it is 
also if not mainly a question of information extraction, transmission, and 
dynamics, and some branches of logic are really branches of information 
theory. Ontology, the study of the nature of being, would be meaningless 
without informational patterns — real, virtual, necessary, possible, or even 
impossible. The philosophy of mind needs informational mental states, 
and the philosophy of language without communication of information 
is pointless. Any philosophy of the logos is a philosophy of information, 
and Christian philosophy of religion is inconceivable without the infor-
mational concept of revelation. The list could be extended and refined 
to aesthetics, hermeneutics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of phys-
ics, and so forth, but the point is clear. To paraphrase Molière, Western 
philosophy has been speaking informationally without knowing it for 
twenty-five centuries. We have always relied on Cinderella working hard 
in the house of philosophy. It is time to acknowledge her great services, 
by designing the philosophy of our time to be properly conceptualized for 
our time.
While information has been a concept in the background for so long 
in the history of philosophy, it now also fits neatly in its foreground. 
Seventeenth-century philosophers redirected their attention from the 
nature of the knowable object (metaphysics) to the relation between the 
object and the knowing subject (epistemology). Problems surrounding 
how we come to know the world then consumed much of modern philoso-
phy. Then, in the twentieth century, philosophers came to reflect primar-
ily on how knowledge is organized — how it is stored and linguistically 
 structured — thus moving from epistemology to philosophy of language 
and logic. And with the growth of the information society in which bil-
lions of people now spend their lives, some philosophers have increasingly 
focused on the very fabric of knowledge — information and its dynamics, 
including communication, flows, and processing. As a result, information 
has arisen as a concept as fundamental and important as being, knowledge, 
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life, intelligence, meaning, and good and evil — all concepts with which it 
is interdependent, and so equally worthy of autonomous investigation. It 
is also a more impoverished concept, in terms of which the others can be 
expressed and to which they can be related. This is why the philosophy 
of information may explain and guide the purposeful construction of our 
intellectual environment, and provide the systematic treatment of the 
conceptual foundations of contemporary society.
The future of philosophy of information depends on how well we 
engage with Turing’s intellectual legacy, with today’s most important 
problems, and with classic philosophical issues. I am optimistic. Philosophy 
of information can help us to expand the frontiers of our understanding 
by providing innovative methodologies for addressing problems from a 
contemporary perspective. Relying on Turing’s intuition of the crucial 
importance of the method of abstraction, it ensures that such problems 
are addressed in the right way. Thanks also to Turing, the Baconian-
Galilean project of reading and manipulating the alphabet of the uni-
verse has begun to be fulfilled in the computational and informational 
revolution, which has produced the tools that can describe and modify 
our environment and ourselves. From this perspective, the philosophy 
of information can be presented as the study of the informational activi-
ties that make possible the construction, conceptualization, and also the 
moral stewardship of reality, both natural and artificial, both physical and 
anthropological. It promises to be one of the most exciting and beneficial 
areas of philosophical research in our time.
